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SCIENTISTS' AESTHETIC PREFERENCES AMONG
THEORIES: CONSERVATIVE FACTORS IN
REVOLUTIONARY CRISES
1 . E M P I R I C A L AND AESTHETIC C O N S I D E R A T I O N S
IN THEORY-CHOICE
Scientists choose among alternative available theories in part on empirical
considerations, but in part also on aesthetic considerations. That is, their choices
to adopt one theory in preference to another are determined partly by the
degree to which they regard the theories in question as "beautiful", "elegant",
or "aesthetically attractive". This paper is a contribution to the study of the
aesthetic considerations to which scientists appeal in theory-choice, and of their
role especially in revolutionary times.
In general, scientists decide cases of theory-choice by referring to a notion
of what counts as an acceptable theory. This notion of acceptability will refer
to a number of criteria by which theories may be evaluated. A theory's score
on these criteria wi l l determine whether it will prove acceptable to a partic-
ular scientist. Undoubtedly, the notion of acceptability to which most scientists
have held is constituted partly by empirical criteria. Most scientists, through
history, have possessed a concept of the empirical performance of theories, and
have aimed to choose theories whose empirical performance will be good. They
have identified properties of theories that are conducive to good empirical per-
formances, and their empirical criteria have attached weight to these properties.
Present-day scientists generally cite internal consistency, predictive accuracy,
breadth of scope, degree of simplicity, and explanatory power as empirical
properties of theories that they value particularly. (For a philosophical account,
see e.g. Newton-Smith, 1981, pp. 226-232.) Although scientists in previous
centuries have given differing analyses of theories' empirical properties, most
scientific disciplines since the Renaissance have valued properties of theories
akin to our "predictive accuracy", for instance.
However, in constructing their notion of what makes a theory acceptable,
many scientists refer to concerns other than for the empirical performance
of theories. Some of these concerns are aesthetic. Many scientists have pos-
sessed a concept of the beauty of theories; they have subjected to aesthetic
appraisal the intellectual constructs that make up theories, and the verdicts
of these appraisals have contributed to determining whether they deemed
each theory acceptable.
It is impossible to give a straightforward list of properties of theories that
scientists regard as conferring aesthetic value to a theory, since scientists in
different disciplines and at different times have found wildly different sets
of properties attractive. Any attempt to list properties conferring beauty to
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theories would thus have to be specific to discipline and time, at least. However,
some general attempt can be made to analyse the experience that a scientist
has when perceiving a theory as beautiful. Scientists commonly describe per-
ceiving beauty in a theory as receiving an impression of aptness; they regard
a theory as beautiful if they regard its properties as apt. Some scientists have
explicitly characterized the beauty of theories in terms of aptness: for instance,
Werner Heisenberg speaks of a theory as being beautiful if it shows "the proper
conformity of the parts to one another and to the whole" (Heisenberg, 1970,
p. 174). Heisenberg's characterization of beauty in theories has been endorsed
by various scientists (e.g. Lipscomb, 1982, p. 4; Chandrasekhar, 1987, p. 70).
Many others, while not offering any so explicit characterization of theoret-
ical beauty, have alluded to feelings of aptness when describing their aesthetic
response to theories.
Explicating the perception that a theory is beautiful as the perception that
its properties are apt is consistent with many treatments of beauty in art
criticism. We commonly speak of properties of an artwork as being appro-
priate, fitting, proper, or seemly. When we say of the conclusion of a musical
composition or of a play that it is just what was demanded or could not
have been different, we are signalling that we regard these elements of them
as apt. In the evaluation of a work of art, the apparent aptness of its proper-
ties is a standard justification for attributing to it aesthetic value. Aptness
has, in fact, been central to concepts of beauty since classical times. Greek
art theorists, including Plato, knew it as prepon, and Roman writers, such as
Vitruvius, as decor. It is because of the importance given to these concepts
that, for instance, the consistent use of architectural orders in building was seen
as ensuring beauty in an edifice (Pollitt, 1974: see pp. 217-218 on prepon,
and pp. 341-347 on decor).
Of course, different properties of theories will strike different observers
as being apt. For instance, while one scientist may experience a sense of aptness
in discerning that a theory exhibits particular symmetries, another might
experience it in discerning that a theory offers a visualization of phenomena
in familiar terms. This fact explains why scientists have regarded many dif-
ferent properties as securing aesthetic value to theories.
I shall refer to any property of theories that is capable of producing a
sense of aptness in one or another scientist as an "aesthetic property" of
those theories. Under this terminological convention, calling a property
"aesthetic" falls short of claiming that a given scientist w i l l find theories
that exhibit that property beautiful: rather, a scientist regarding a theory expe-
riences a sense of aptness only upon discerning in it specified aesthetic
properties, viz., those to which he or she attaches the value of beauty. Again,
this usage conforms with standard talk. In passing an aesthetic appraisal of
a building, for instance, we examine it for its aesthetic properties; however,
what is required if we are to consider it beautiful is not that it should possess
any aesthetic properties whatsoever, but that it should possess some of the
aesthetic properties to which we attach value. I take it that which particular
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aesthetic properties of theories a scientist attaches value to is specified by
that scientist's aesthetic evaluative criteria.
I consider scientists' aesthetic criteria to be just as central to scientists'
notions of the acceptability of theories as are their empirical criteria. This
interpretation of scientists' aesthetic considerations will find little favor with
those philosophers of science who identify the "scientific" with the "empiri-
cist". On their view, scientific activity is the construction of logically consistent
theories to explain empirical data: all other concerns are external influences
acting on science. For instance, Philipp Frank drew a distinction between
two sets of criteria for theory-evaluation, which he termed the "scientific"
and the "extra-scientific". His "scientific" criteria are "agreement with obser-
vations and logical consistency": all other criteria, doubtless including aesthetic
criteria, are extra-scientific (Frank, 1957, p. 359). Such views of science would,
I believe, lead us to misrepresent the construction of scientists' standards for
the acceptability of theories, ignoring the role within them of various sets of
considerations that cannot properly be described as empirical. In fact, both
aesthetic and empirical criteria take part in determining scientists' notions of
the acceptability of theories. This does not mean, of course, that we can draw
no useful distinction between scientists' empirical and aesthetic considerations;
but it does mean that the distinctions we draw between them cannot be por-
trayed as a demarcation between the scientific and the extra-scientific.
Once we have established that scientific communities evaluate theories
both on their empirical and on their aesthetic properties, many interesting
questions arise. The one on which this paper will focus is: what contribu-
tions do evaluations of these two sorts make to shaping the historical
development of science? The answer today usually given to this question
is that scientists' aesthetic preferences inspire them to inventiveness and
iconoclasm, while their empirical norms hold them to continuity and conser-
vatism. Perhaps this view descends from the images, widespread in present-
clay Western culture, of aesthetics-governed activity as the realm of imagi-
nation and daring and of data-governed activity as the realm of proof and
punctiliousness. In the course of this paper, I shall outline a contrary view: I
shall claim that, at crucial junctures of the history of science, scientists' empir-
ical concerns lead them to invention and novelty in theorizing, while their
aesthetic preferences among theories curb and resist innovation. We begin
by examining one of the most elaborate formulations of the standard view,
given by Thomas S. Kühn.
2. K U H N ' S VIEW OF AESTHETIC FACTORS
Kühn sees in science two modes of development: the normal mode, in which
scientists cultivate their discipline by progressing from theory to theory, and
a revolutionary mode, in which scientists switch not just between theories
but between paradigms. Kühn considers that in both modes of development
scientists choose among these intellectual constructs partly in the light of
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their empirical and aesthetic properties. However, these sets of properties
play different roles in the two modes of development.
According to Kühn, aesthetic factors play no decisive role in theory-choice
within normal science. He says that, in the puzzle-solving of which normal
science consists, the usual stimulus for scientists' coming to embrace a new
theory is its being demonstrated empirically superior to its competitors. Kühn
has formulated five criteria, including those of predictive accuracy and degree
of simplicity, on which one theory may be judged empirically superior to
another (Kühn, 1977, pp. 321-323).
By contrast, a new paradigm's empirical properties will typically not enable
it to poach adherents from a better-established paradigm, Kühn believes.
After all, he says, a mature paradigm wi l l have developed problem-solving
resources that new paradigms are unable to match. Therefore, scientists in a
revolutionary crisis will typically find their estimates of the competing para-
digms' empirical properties weighing in favor of their current paradigm, and
inhibi t ing paradigm-switch (Kühn, 1962, pp. 156-157).
Kühn identifies the factors that tend to induce paradigm-switch in arguments
of a different sort: "These are the arguments, rarely made entirely explicit, that
appeal to the individual's sense of the appropriate or the aesthetic - the new
theory is said to be 'neater', 'more suitable,' or 'simpler' than the old" (ibid.,
p. 155). Kühn suggests that, without the contribution of such arguments, it
might be impossible for a world-view to develop into a paradigm dominant
in its community:
The importance of aesthetic considerations can sometimes be decisive. Though they often
attract only a few scientists to a new theory, it is upon those few that its ultimate triumph may
depend. If they had not quickly taken it up for highly ind iv idua l reasons, the new candidate
for paradigm might never have been sufficiently developed to attract the allegiance of the
scientific community as a whole. (Ibid., p. 156)
This means that, at times when scientists are deliberating whether to switch
paradigm, their empirical and aesthetic considerations weigh on opposite sides.
Empirical considerations wil l militate in favor of preserving the status quo,
since the well-established paradigm will generally have superior problem-
solving capability. But aesthetic considerations can sometimes outweigh this
conservative bias:
Something must make at least a few scientists feel that the new proposal is on the right track,
and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations that can do that.
Men have been converted by them at times when most of the articulable technical arguments
pointed the other way. When first introduced, neither Copernicus' astronomical theory nor DC
Brogue's theory of matter had many other significant grounds of appeal. (Ihid., p. 158)
Kühn is willing to test these claims against the history of science. An appro-
priate test is performed as follows. We must identify a theory of which the
adoption, we agree, constituted a revolution in some branch of science. We
must then ascertain what role the empirical and aesthetic properties of that
theory and its displaced predecessor played in either inducing or inhibiting
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the paradigm-switch. Kuhn's model of revolutions would be shown to accord
with this episode of the history of science just if we found that the paradigm-
switch was inhibited by empirical considerations and induced by aesthetic
factors.
As a suitable test-case, Kühn picks the transition from Ptolemy's to
Copernicus's theory in mathematical astronomy, which he maintains consti-
tuted a revolution (Kühn, 1957, p. 134; 1962, pp. 149-150). He reconstructs
the grounds on which mid-sixteenth-century mathematical astronomers decided
between these theories. Kühn claims that the Copernican theory could not have
won adherents from Ptolemy's theory on the grounds of either predictive
accuracy or degree of simplici ty: "Judged on purely practical grounds,
Copernicus' new planetary system was a failure; it was neither more accurate
nor significantly simpler than its Ptolemaic predecessors" (Kühn, 1957, p. 171).
Rather, Kühn believes that Copernican theory gained adherents on the strength
of its aesthetic properties. According to Kühn, the arguments advanced in
De revolutionibus show that Copernicus himself was aware that he could
attract Ptolemaic astronomers to his theory most effectively by stressing its
aesthetic virtues:
Each argument cites an aspect of the appearances that can be explained by cither the Ptolemaic
or the Copernican system, and each then proceeds to point out how much more harmonious,
coherent, and natural the Copernican explanation is. (. . .) Copernicus' arguments are not prag-
matic. They appeal, if at all, not to the utilitarian sense of the practicing astronomer but to his
aesthetic sense and to that alone. (. . .) The harmonies to which Copernicus' arguments pointed
did not enable the astronomer to perform his job better. New harmonics did not increase accuracy
or simplicity. Therefore they could and did appeal primarily to tha t l imi ted and perhaps irra-
tional subgroup of mathematical astronomers whose Ncoplatonic ear for mathematical harmonies
could not be obstructed by page after page of complex mathematics leading finally to numer-
ical predictions scarcely better than those they had known before, (/hid., p. 181, emphasis as
in the original; see also ibid., p. 172)
Kühn concludes that Copernicus's theory established itself in virtue primarily
of its aesthetic properties and despite being able to demonstrate no empirical
superiority over Ptolemy's theory. Therefore, he judges that, qua paradigm-
switch, the transition from Ptolemaic to Copernican mathematical astronomy
accords with his view of the role of aesthetic factors in revolution.
I shall try to show that Kühn has misread the roles played by empirical
and aesthetic factors in scientific revolutions. I trace my disagreement out as
follows. Kühn has advanced three interrelated claims about scientists' aesthetic
preferences and scientific revolutions:
1. Theory-succession wi th in a paradigm (i.e., in normal science) is typically
prompted by empirical factors; paradigm-switch in a scientific revolution
is typically prompted by aesthetic factors and inhibited by empirical factors.
2. The transition from Ptolemy's to Copernicus's theory constituted a revo-
lution in mathematical astronomy.
3. In the choice open to mid-sixteenth-century mathematical astronomers
between Ptolemy's theory and Copernicus's, the switch to Copernicus's
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theory was encouraged by aesthetic factors (viz., the aesthetic properties
of Copernicus's theory) and inhibited by empirical factors (viz., compar-
isons of the empirical capabilities of the two theories).
Claim 2 specifies how, in Kuhn's view, the transition from Ptolemy's theory
to Copernicus's may be adduced as evidence in evaluating claim 1. On the
assumption of claim 2, claim 3 presents that historical episode as evidence
favorable to 1. In what follows, I endorse claim 3, but reject 1 and 2. I shall
argue that Kuhn's own findings about the transition from Ptolemaic to
Copernican theory ought to persuade us that this episode constituted no
revolution. Copernican theory was able to attract adherents through the appeal
of its aesthetic properties precisely because of its conservatism, its f u l f i l -
ment of aesthetic canons that had long shaped the preferences of mathematical
astronomers. I shall proceed to sketch a revised model of scientific revolu-
tion, that suggests that the factors which Kühn sees as tending to induce
revolutions tend in fact to inhibit them, and vice versa. I shall support some
elements of this model by further reference to early modern mathematical
astronomy.
3. HOW DID C O P E R N I C A N THEORY ATTRACT A D H E R E N T S ?
If mid-sixteenth-century mathematical astronomers had been attracted to
Copernicus's theory on empirical considerations, we would expect them to
have been able to portray it as superior to Ptolemy's theory in such qualities
as predictive accuracy or degree of simplicity.
There are two classes of predictions in which the accuracy of Copernicus's
theory could be compared to that of Ptolemy's: quantitative predictions of
the positions of the celestial bodies, and qualitative predictions of the appear-
ance of the night sky from the Earth.
Take first the quantitative predictions of Copernicus's theory. There is
little evidence either that Copernicus's work was motivated by dissatisfac-
tion with the current accuracy of astronomical predictions, or that it brought
an improvement in that accuracy. The quantitative track record of the Ptolemaic
theory in the sixteenth century was still generally perceived as good: the
claim advanced by some old historiography that by the mid-sixteenth century
the Ptolemaic theory had led astronomy into an "empirical crisis", which
Copernicus resolved, is not tenable (Gingerich, 1975). At the opening of both
the Commentariolus, a treatise which he composed probably in 1510-14, and
De revolutionibus, Copernicus pronounces himself content with the accuracy
of the predictions of planetary positions yielded by Ptolemaic theory
(Swerdlow, 1973, p. 434; Copernicus, 1543, p. 4). The numerical predictions
of the Ptolemaic and the Copernican theories have been compared by several
historians of mathematical astronomy, who have found the latter no more
accurate than the former (Price, 1959, pp. 209-212; Gingerich, 1975, pp.
85-86; Cohen, 1985, pp. 117-119). Furthermore, a comparison of the predictive
accuracy of the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories would have required data
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more precise than were available in Copernicus's lifetime, or for decades to
follow. Thus, even if the Copernican theory had yielded quantitative predic-
tions more accurate than its Ptolemaic competitor, this superiority would not
have been apparent to astronomers of the time.
Copernicus's theory failed to establish a clear superiority over its Ptolemaic
competitor also in qualitative predictions about the appearance of the heavens.
For instance, many of his contemporaries reasoned that, if the Earth truly
moved, the apparent positions of stars viewed from the Earth should oscil-
late, by the effect of parallax. The fact that no such oscillations could be
observed supported Ptolemaic theory better than Copernican. As a second
example, take the problem of accounting for the observation that the apparent
luminosity of Venus is approximately constant. The present-day explanation
of this fact is that the apparent luminosity of Venus depends both on its distance
from the Earth and on its phase, or proportion of the planet's orb which reflects
light towards the Earth; and the effects of these two quantities compensate
for one another almost exactly. But the phases of Venus were first detected
only in 1610 by Galileo. Ptolemaic theory suggested that the distance of Venus
from the Earth varies greatly: if that were true, one would expect the apparent
luminosity of Venus to vary correspondingly widely. But Copernicus's theory
predicts a similar variation in the Earth-Venus distance, and offers no separate
explanation for the constancy of the apparent luminosity of Venus. So the
Ptolemaic and Copernican theories fared about equally poorly in accounting
for this observation (Price, 1959, pp. 212-214).
On the basis of such considerations, Robert Palter concludes that
Copernicus's theory was not perceptibly superior to Ptolemy's in predictive
accuracy. "In order to square this fact with the putative reality of a 'Copernican
revolution' ", according to Palter, "one is constrained to fall back on the
criterion of simplicity" (Palter, 1970, pp. 114-115). If Copernicus's theory had
a degree of simplicity greater than Ptolemy's, although it may offer no greater
predictive accuracy, it could st i l l be portrayed as empirically superior to the
latter.
Many historians and philosophers of science have suggested that the degree
of its simplicity was the chief virtue of the Copernican theory, and the property
on the strength of which it in fact attracted support. For instance, Hans
Reichenbach writes: "Copernicus (. . .) was able, in fact, to cite as a distinct
advantage only the greater simplicity of his system" (Reichenbach, 1927,
p. 18). All too often, however, present-day estimates of the relative degrees
of simplicity of the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories have been naive, con-
sisting merely of a count of the circles in the geometrical constructions to which
the theories appealed: Ptolemy's 80-odd circles are routinely contrasted with
the 30 or so required by Copernicus's theory (e.g. Kordig, 1971, p. 109; for
further délai I s and examples of the count see Palter, 1970, pp. 94 and 113-114;
and Cohen, 1985, p. 119). While overall numbers of circles may contribute
to determine the theories' degrees of simplicity, they cannot be taken as the
defini t ive measure of this parameter. (For some problems encountered in
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comparing theories in simplicity, see McAllister, 1991.) Indeed, on another
set of criteria, Owen Gingerich judges that "the Copernican system is slightly
more complicated than the original Ptolemaic system" (Gingerich, 1975,
p. 87).
Among the many different standpoints from which the degrees of simplicity
of the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories could be compared, let us choose
one that might hold significance for Renaissance mathematical astronomers
themselves. Their typical task was to calculate the apparent position of a
planet viewed from the Earth. No calculation of this sort on Ptolemaic theory
required the use of all its 80-odd circles: it needed no more than the six or
so circles governing the motions of the planet to which the problem referred.
Copernicus's theory, by contrast, supposed that both the Earth and the planet,
whose apparent position was required, were in motion. Therefore, the position
of a planet as seen from the Earth at some moment could not be calculated
on Copernican theory without referring to the circles governing the motions
of both bodies. In this sense, as a set of solutions to individual problems,
Ptolemaic theory is simpler and more convenient - if somewhat less system-
atic - than that of Copernicus (Hanson, 1961, pp. 175-177).
In fact, the Copernican theory was not at the time of its enunciation reputed
to be any simpler than the Ptolemaic theory (Cohen, 1960, p. 58; Neugebauer,
1968). There is evidence that, in his maturity, even Copernicus realized he
could claim on behalf of his system a degree of simplicity no greater than
that of the Ptolemaic theory. His early work, the Commentariolus, had sug-
gested that his theory was simpler than the Ptolemaic theory (Swerdlow,
1973, pp. 434-436). If Copernicus had maintained this belief, he would surely
have repeated and elaborated on it in his more systematic treatise. De revo-
lutionibus, just as most of the other arguments in defense of the Copernican
theory that appear in the Commentariolus receive an extended treatment in
the later work. Instead, De revolutionibus omits claims that Copernicus's theory
was simpler than Ptolemy's (Pera, 1981, pp. 157-159).
Neither predictive accuracy nor degree of simplicity thus emerge as decisive
factors in favor of the Copernican theory. On what grounds then did
Copernicus's theory prove preferable to Ptolemy's? As Kühn and other present-
day historians have documented, these grounds were primarily its aesthetic
properties (Neugebauer, 1968, p. 103; Neyman, 1974, p. 9; Gingerich, 1975,
pp. 89-90; Hallyn, 1987, pp. 73-103; Hutchison, 1987, pp. 109-136; and
Westman, 1990, pp. 171-172). Evidence that sixteenth-century astronomers
were attracted to Copernican theory by its aesthetic properties is contained
in, for instance, the admiration for Copernicus's achievement that Tycho Brahe
expressed in a letter of 1587 to the astronomer Christoph Rothmann:
Copernicus (. . .) had the most perfect understanding of the geometrical and arithmetical
requisites for building up this discipline (of astronomy). Nor was he in this respect inferior to
Ptolemy; on the contrary, he surpassed him greatly in certain fields, particularly as far as t in-
device of fitness and compendious harmony in hypotheses is concerned. (Quoted in the trans-
lation of Moesgaard, 1972, p. 38)
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Copernicus himself expected that his theory would win support on its aesthetic
virtues. He claims as the chief merit of his theory an internal harmony greater
than that of Ptolemy's:
Those who devised the eccentrics seem thereby in large measure to have solved the problem
of the apparent motions with appropriate calculations. But meanwhile they introduced a good
many ideas which apparently contradict the first principles of uniform motion. Nor could they
elicit or deduce from the eccentrics the principal consideration, that is, the structure of the universe
and the true symmetry of its parts. On the contrary, their experience was just like some one t ak ing
from various places hands, feet, a head, and other pieces, very well depicted, it may be, but
not for the representation of a single person; since these fragments would not belong to one
another at all, a monster rather than a man would be put together from them. (Copernicus.
1543, p. 4; see also p. 22. For further discussion, see Rose, 1975, and Westman, 1990,
pp. 179-182)
We may thus join Kühn in his conviction that Copernicus's theory owed
its adoption to aesthetic factors. However, the import of this conclusion for
models of scientific revolutions does not emerge until it has been ascertained
whether the adoption of Copernicus's theory in fact constituted a revolution.
4. THE CONSERVATISM OF COPERNICUS
In the fourth century B.C., Aristotle had enunciated three principles in
cosmology: a principle of geocentricity; a principle of distinct physical regions,
which held that the physical nature of the sublunary region (composed of
the Earth and its atmosphere) differs from that of the supralunary region
(containing the celestial bodies); and a principle of the circularity and uni-
formity of celestial motions, which held that the heavenly bodies move with
uniform linear velocities along paths that are circles or compounds of circles.
The latter two principles, in particular, were deeply intertwined in Aris-
totelian natural philosophy. Objects in the sublunary region, composed of
the four elements traditionally cited in ancient cosmologies, were subject to
violent or forced motions, in which they were displaced from their natural
locations. By contrast, celestial bodies were composed of a fifth element or
quintessence, ether, which gave them perfection and ensured that they moved
only with motions natural to them. These motions were circular and uniform
(Randall, 1960, pp. 153-162).
Aristotle's corpus did not contain a theory of mathematical astronomy,
but his three cosmological principles imposed constraints on how the heavens
might be mathematically described. Mathematical astronomy in succeeding
centuries was profoundly influenced by them, but not equally strongly by all
three. The principle most frequently disputed was that of geocentricity.
Pythagorean astronomers, such as Aristarchus of Samos in the third century
B.C., flatly rejected it, embracing heliocentrism in its place (Heninger, 1974,
pp. 127-128). Heliocentrism was supported also by forms of sun-worship,
which retained its popularity into the Renaissance. Another astronomical
system watered down geocentrism by portraying the sun, moon and outer
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planets as orbiting the Earth, but Mercury and Venus as orbiting the sun.
This theory, first propounded by Heraclides of Pontus in the fourth century
B.C., was widely endorsed by learned people throughout the Middle Ages.
Aristotle's most faithful disciples were naturally anxious to supplement
his physical cosmology with a theory of mathematical astronomy which
adhered as closely as possible to all his cosmological principles. Such
astronomers as Apollonius of Perga (third century B.C.) and Hipparchus
(second century B.C.) accepted the constraints of the principles of geocen-
tricity and of the circularity and uniformity of celestial motions: they described
the motions of celestial bodies by appeal to systems of circles centered at
least roughly on the center of the Earth. Further, since their theories were
primarily mathematical models that advanced few physical claims, they did
not conflict either with Aristotle's principle of distinct physical regions.
The chief difficulty encountered by astronomers in this tradition was in
accounting satisfactorily for observational data. Several times it occurred that
a theory was recognized to be incapable of accommodating the data to accept-
able accuracy with its arrangement of circles, and was succeeded by a still
more intricate geometrical system. Eventually, around A.D. 150, it was con-
cluded by Ptolemy that a satisfactory accord with data required the introduction
of a new adjustable geometrical device.
Consider all cases of bodies moving along a circle with angular (not linear)
velocity that is uniform about a particular geometrical point; and call this,
as did Ptolemy, the "equant point". In some of these cases, the body moves
also with uniform linear velocity along its circle: these are the cases in which
the equant point coincides with the center of the circle. In constructing an astro-
nomical theory, it may be stipulated that the equant point governing a certain
body's motion should coincide with the center of the circle along which that
body travels; this is what, in effect, Ptolemy's predecessors had stipulated in
stating that celestial bodies travel with uniform linear velocity. By contrast,
Ptolemy allowed himself the extra degree of freedom of locating the equant
point so as to optimize the system's fit with the data: the equant point wi l l then
coincide with the center of the circle only occasionally and accidentally.
Thanks partly to this extra degree of freedom, Ptolemy's theory was much
better than its predecessors' at according with the observational data. However,
reference to equant points amounted to relaxing somewhat the commitment
to the principle of the circularity and uniformity of celestial motions, since
the theory no longer represented heavenly bodies as moving along their orbits
with uniform linear velocities.
To Copernicus, this relatively late innovation in Hellenistic astronomical
thinking was unacceptable. Copernicus considered that subscribing to the prin-
ciple of the circularity and uniformity of celestial motions was mandatory
for astronomical theory (Brackenridge, 1982, pp. 118-121). Appeals to equant
points violated this fundamental principle, and Copernicus wished to rid
astronomical theory of them. This intention is visible in both his polemics
and his positive theorizing. First, he attacked Ptolemaic astronomy in both
the Commentariolus and De revolutionibus not as a heliocentrist astronomer
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criticizing a geocentric theory, but on the grounds that Ptolemy had adhered
insufficiently strictly to the principle of the circularity and uniformity of celes-
tial motions. Secondly, he constructed a theory which, by avoiding use of
equant points, more fully satisfied the principle of the circularity and unifor-
mity of celestial motions, as well as being consistent with the principle of
distinct physical regions. He retraced his reasoning at the opening of the
Commentariolus:
The theories concerning these matters that have been put forth far and wide by Ptolemy and
most others, although they correspond numerically (with the apparent motions), also seemed quite
doubtful, for these theories were inadequate unless they also envisioned certain equant circles,
on account of which it appeared that the planet never moves with uniform velocity either in its
deferent sphere or with respect to its proper center. Therefore a theory of this kind seemed neither
perfect enough nor sufficiently in accordance with reason.
Therefore, when I noticed these (difficulties), I often pondered whether perhaps a more
reasonable model composed of circles could be found from which every apparent irregularity
would follow while everything in itself moved uniformly, just as the principle of perfect motion
requires. (Swerdlow, 1973, pp. 434-435; interpolations by Swcrdlow)
In other words, Copernicus sought to formulate an astronomical theory that
was more Aristotelian than Ptolemy's had been.
This achievement, it is true, involved sacrificing the principle of geocen-
tricity and the belief that the Earth is immobile; and these changes too were
opposed by Aristotelian natural philosophers (Grant, 1984). However, the prin-
ciple of geocentricity was, as we have seen, the least deeply entrenched and
most widely disputed of the three principles of Western astronomy. In relaxing
adherence to the principle of geocentricity, Copernicus was therefore following
a tradition relatively familiar to his readers. Indeed, in De revolutionibus
Copernicus cited Pythagorean heliocentrism as a precedent for his own proposal
(Copernicus, 1543, pp. 5 and 12); and many contemporaries interpreted
Copernicus straightforwardly as having revived Pythagoreanism in astronomy
(Heninger, 1974, p. 130).
Copernicus seems to have believed that the fact that his theory adhered more
faithfully than Ptolemy's to the principle of the circularity and uniformity of
celestial motions would prompt astronomers to transfer their allegiances from
Ptolemy's theory to his own, despite the fact that it was able to demonstrate
no clear empirical superiority. He was largely correct in this expectation. There
is good evidence that many late-sixteenth-century mathematical astronomers
found this feature of Copernican theory so attractive as to outweigh any
reservations they may have had against the theory on other grounds. Examples
of this attitude are offered by Erasmus Reinhold and by Tycho. Reinhold,
one of the leading astronomers of his time, who endorsed Copernicus's theory
primarily on the ground of its elimination of the equant point and its restora-
tion of uniform circular motions; the fact that it placed the sun rather than
the Earth at the center of the universe appears not to have greatly influenced
his opinion of the theory (Gingerich, 1973, pp. 55-59). Similarly, in his letter
of 1587 to Rothmann, after having paid tribute to Copernicus's ability to attain
"fitness and compendious harmony in hypotheses", Tycho wrote:
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(Copernicus's) apparently absurd opinion that the Earth revolves does not obstruct this estimate,
because a circular motion designed to go on uniformly about another point than the very center
of the circle, as actually found in the Ptolemaic hypotheses of all the planets except that of the
Sun, offends against the very basic principles of our discipline in a far more absurd and
intolerable way than does the attributing to the Earth one motion or another (. . .)• There does
not arise from this assumption so many unsuitable consequences as most people think. (Quoted
in the translation of Moesgaard, 1972, p. 38)
In the light of its relation to the Aristotelian cosmological principles,
Copernicus's theory was seen by contemporaries as a return to long-established
values in the construction of astronomical models: as a restoration more
than a revolution (Neugebauer, 1952, p. 206; Hanson, 1961; Cohen, 1985,
pp. 123-125). As Robert S. Westman claims, far from being perceived as
iconoclastic, the Copernican theory was respectfully welcomed into what Kühn
would term the "normal science" of mid-sixteenth-century mathematical
astronomy (Westman, 1975, pp. 191-192).
This finding alerts us to inadequacies in Kuhn's account of aesthetic factors
in science. Having drawn attention - with much justice - to the part played
by the aesthetic properties of Copernicus's theory in winning it support, Kühn
is led to portray Copernicus's theory as a revolution. Under that portrayal, after
all, the reception of Copernicanism would support his view that paradigm-
switch is typically induced by aesthetic factors and inhibited by empirical
factors. But the historical evidence suggests overwhelmingly that, for any
reasonable construal of "scientific revolution", Copernicus's theory did not
constitute a revolution in mathematical astronomy. A model of aesthetic con-
siderations which regarded them as a conservative factor would yield a more
adequate view of the history of Copernicanism: it would enable us both to
acknowledge fu l ly the role of aesthetic considerations in the reception of
Copernican theory, and to explain why contemporaries regarded the theory
as non-revolutionary.
5. R E V O L U T I O N AS THE A B A N D O N M E N T OF
AESTHETIC COMMITMENTS
The formation of scientists' aesthetic preferences is patently backward-looking.
Scientists tend to regard as beautiful those theories that have long been estab-
lished, or that at least resemble theories that have long been established, in
their community. Even a theory that is deemed aesthetically unattractive upon
its first formulation can win aesthetic acceptance and admiration, if it remains
established in the community for long enough. The history of Newtonian
mechanics, of quantum mechanics, even of quantum field theory exhibits
aspects of this phenomenon.
Of course, what enables a theory to win increasing aesthetic acceptance
is not simply the passage of time: I do not suggest that scientists' taste is simply
for the ancient. Rather, I hypothesize that a scientist's aesthetic preferences are
shaped by the factor that ensures that certain theories remain long estab-
lished in a community: their enduring empirical success. The mechanism by
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which scientists' aesthetic preferences are constructed and revised, I suggest,
is inductive. A community constructs its aesthetic canon at a certain date
from among the aesthetic features of all past theories by attributing to each
feature a weighting roughly proportional to the degree of empirical success
scored up to that date by the theories which have embodied that feature. (The
degree of empirical success scored by theories is, of course, judged by the
application of the community's empirical criteria of theory-evaluation.) The
collection of aesthetic features and weightings thus assembled forms the com-
munity's aesthetic canon, which is thereafter used in judging new theories
(McAllister, 1989, pp. 36-41).
This inductive mechanism ensures that aesthetic canons in science are
conservative: they will tend to attribute greater value to, and to recommend
for adoption, theories which duplicate the aesthetic features embodied by the
empirically more successful theories of the recent past. The conservative bias
of aesthetic canons has some interesting implications for models of scien-
tific revolutions.
During certain time spans, its aesthetic evaluative canon will not hinder
a community from adopting the empirically best-performing theories on
offer. This situation holds as long as the aesthetic features of an empirically
successful theory differ to only a small extent from those of its predeces-
sors: in such a case, the aesthetic canon is able to evolve fast enough that,
at any time, it expresses preference for the aesthetic features of the empirically
most successful theory then available. By contrast, if the aesthetic features
of one empirically successful theory differ too greatly from those of its pre-
decessors, the community's aesthetic canon will not be renewed sufficiently
quickly to reflect those changes. The canon will lag behind developments, con-
tinuing to express greater preference for aesthetic features that were exhibited
by the community's former best theories, but that are not shown by the current
best theories.
This lag of aesthetic canons behind technical resources is apparent also in
the applied arts such as architecture and industrial design, which - unlike other
arts - possess a notion of empirical performance. When technical resources
in the applied arts progress at a high rate, aesthetic canons may fail to renew
themselves fast enough to ensure that the most powerful resources available
can always be given a form considered seemly. In the following passage,
Maxwell Fry discusses the implications for architectural design of the high rate
of technical progress seen during the nineteenth century:
The rapidity of this change cut the ground away from under the architect's feet. (. . .) If the
structural developments which have led to our present technical skill were to continue at the same
pace into this century, at a pace, that is. exceeding our capacity as artists to assimilate them,
then our hopes of establishing a workable architecture would be slight. (Fry. 1944, p. 122)
This incapacity of architectural canons to keep pace with technical develop-
ments is analogous to the lag of aesthetic canons in a science in a revolutionary
crisis.
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In these circumstances, a scientist who rigorously applied the established
aesthetic canons would be unable to adopt the empirically best-performing
theories available. In their reactions to this fact, members of the community
will show two patterns of behavior. Some will deem it advantageous to suspend
their allegiance to the established aesthetic canon, and to conduct theory-choice
on empirical criteria alone. Others will find this too deep a rupture with
tradition, and will allow their theory-choices to continue to be determined
by their aesthetic commitments, even though this decision delivers them
theories that are empirically less successful than other available theories.
Eventually, the gap in empirical performance between the theories chosen
by these two factions will widen to such an extent that retention of the old
aesthetic preferences is no longer a defensible option. When this occurs, the
entire community wil l align itself with the theory-choices of the more empir-
ically-minded faction, and the period of controversy will come to a close. In
the years that follow, of course, the community gradually forms a fresh aes-
thetic canon, through the renewed operation of the inductive mechanism, and
the historical cycle recommences.
This, I suggest, is how a scientific revolution should be interpreted: as
the forced repudiation of aesthetic constraints which a community had become
accustomed to imposing on its theory-choices. This model of revolutions
explains several features of such episodes. For instance, it explains the
sensation of many scientists in a pre-revolutionary period that they face
irreconcilable demands: their wish to maximize empirical performance is
frustrated by their allegiance to the established aesthetic canons. Secondly, it
explains why the theories adopted in a revolution "look strange" to many
contemporaries: aesthetic or perceptual criteria played no part in their selec-
tion. Thirdly, it explains why, against Kuhn's expectations, the theories adopted
before and after a revolution are not entirely incommensurable: although they
do not have the same aesthetic style, there are common criteria on which
their empirical performance can be compared (McAllister, 1989, pp. 41-47).
In the light of this model of scientific revolutions, I read developments in
early-modern mathematical astronomy as follows. In adopting Copernicus's
theory, mathematical astronomers rightly saw themselves as holding to long-
established aesthetic commitments of their community. This theory therefore
did not constitute a revolution. The early-modern revolution in mathematical
astronomy occurred only at the hands of Kepler, as we shall next see.
6. THE ICONOCLASM OF KEPLER'S ELLIPSES
Kepler's Astronomia nova of 1609 sets out his first two laws of planetary
motion. These were the fruit of his "war on Mars", the effort which he under-
took between 1600 and 1605 to discover a mathematical law to describe the
motion of the sun's fourth planet. Kepler had at his disposal the observa-
tional data collected by his former employer, Tycho: they had an accuracy
of around 1%, substantially higher than any previous comparable data. Kepler
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appears to have reached his first law - that every planet's orbit is an ellipse
having the sun at one focus - by, roughly speaking, an alternation of theo-
retical hypotheses and empirical tests: he proposed a succession of
candidate-paths for the orbit of Mars and gauged the accord of each with
Tycho's data.
Kepler tested first the hypothesis that Mars moved in a circle. He found that
its angular coordinates would then have departed by as much as 8% from those
recorded by Tycho. This discrepancy was in Kepler's view sufficiently large
for a circular orbit to be ruled out (Whiteside, 1974, pp. 6-7). The distribu-
tion of discrepancies along the orbit suggested to Kepler in 1602 the curve
which he should next consider: "The orbit is not a circle, but (passing from
aphelion) enters in a little on either side (at quadratures) and goes out again
to the breadth of the circle at perihelion, in a path of the sort called an oval"
(Quoted ibid., p. 8; interpolations by Whiteside). However, Kepler could not
reconcile even this hypothesis to his satisfaction with the data. He concluded
in 1604 that the true orbit must be a curve contained between the circle and
the oval, and in the same breath suggested which curve this was:
In the middle longitudes (. . .) the perfect circle prolongs (the true orbital path) by about 800
or 900 (parts in 152350, the mean radius of orbit) too much. My ovality curtails by about 400
too much. The truth is in the middle, though nearer to my ovality (. . .) just as though Mars's
path were a perfect ellipse. (Quoted ibid., p. 11)
The first law of planetary motion that Kepler published in the Asironomia nova
expressed this conclusion.
The role played in Kepler's reasoning by empirical factors is evident: the
theory that he published in 1609 was the empirically best-performing of the
candidates that he had examined. Empirical considerations were responsible
equally for the theory's gradual acceptance in the community. Initially, many
astronomers were unable to evaluate the empirical quality of Kepler's theory:
they were much less familiar with the properties of the ellipse than with
those of the circle, and found it difficult to deduce from the theory predic-
tions to test against observation. The theory's empirical performance became
more obvious after 1627, when Kepler published the Tabulae Rudolphinae
(Russell, 1964, pp. 7 and 20). This was a compilation of tables and rules for
predicting the positions of the moon and planets, based on Kepler's laws: in
essence, it was a tabulation of the observational consequences of Kepler's
theory, which by this means opened itself to easy empirical test. Use of the
Tabulae Rudolphinae quickly demonstrated that Kepler's theory was very
successful at predicting the positions of the planets - even those of Mercury,
the planet that had thus far proved most recalcitrant to astronomical theory.
The effect of the empirical performance of Kepler's theory on the com-
munity's opinion of it is illustrated by the conversion of Peter Crüger, Professor
of Mathematics at Danzig. In the early years after the publication of Kepler's
theory, he recoiled from it. He wrote for instance in 1624: "I do not sub-
scribe to the hypotheses of Kepler. I trust that God will grant us some other
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way of arriving at the true theory of Mars" (Quoted ibid., p. 8 where also more
evidence is given of Cruger's early unfavorable response to Kepler's theory.)
Once the Tabulae Rudolphinae had appeared, however, Crüger revised his
opinion. Writing to the astronomer Philipp Müller in 1629, Crüger expressed
the impact on him of the empirical corroboration of Kepler's theory:
You hope that someone wil l give these tables (the astronomical tables of Longomontanus) a
further polishing and you say that all astronomers would be grateful for this. But I should have
thought that it would be a waste of time now that the Rudolphine Tables have been published,
since all astronomers will undoubtedly use these. ( . . .)! am wholly occupied with trying to under-
stand the foundations upon which the Rudolphine rules and tables are based, and I am using
for this purpose the Epitome of Astronomy previously published by Kepler as an introduction
to the tables. This epitome which previously I had (. . .) so many times thrown aside, I now
take up again and study (. . .). I am no longer repelled by the elliptical form of the planetary
orbits (. . .). (Quoted ibid., p. 8)
This is evidence that Kepler's theory won adherents on the strength of its
empirical properties. The last sentence of this passage, moreover, contains a
clue that Kepler's theory had in i t i a l ly encountered opposition because of
other features of it: its aesthetic and metaphysical properties.
The Aristotelian principle of the circularity and uniformity of celestial
motions, whose power in the mid-sixteenth century we discussed in Section
4, still retained some influence in the early seventeenth century. It continued
to captivate natural philosophers such as Galileo (Koyré, 1939, p. 144;
Panofsky, 1954, p. 25); even Kepler had not been wholly immune to it
(Brackenridge, 1982). Kepler's claim that planets moved in elliptical orbits
stood in clear violation of this principle, and was accorded a correspond-
ingly hostile reception by conservative astronomers. They did not try to justify
their hostility on empirical grounds: they did not claim that postulating non-
circular orbits rendered astronomical theory incapable of accounting with
sufficient accuracy for observational data. Rather, they argued on a non-empir-
ical, or metaphysical, criterion, that only the postulation of circular orbits could
produce the harmony demanded in planetary astronomy. For instance, Tycho
had written to Kepler in 1599:
The orbits of the planets must be constructed exclusively from circular motions; otherwise they
could not recur with a uniform and equal constancy, eternal duration would be impossible;
moreover, the orbits would be less simple, would exhibit greater irregularities and would not
be suitable for scientific treatment and practice. (Quoted in the translation of Mittelstrass, 1972,
p. 210)
Hostility to the suggestion that planetary orbits were elliptical was height-
ened by the perceived aesthetic contrast between ellipses and circles: whereas
today we tend to describe the circle as the special case of the ellipse in which
the two axes have equal length, the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries
saw the ellipse as a distorted and imperfect circle.
Let us return to the passage by Crüger that I quoted. I interpret its last
sentence as indicating that Crüger renounces one of the criteria upon which
he had previously objected to Kepler's theory: he no longer opposes the theory
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on the grounds that it describes the planetary orbits as elliptical. The reason
why Crüger feels he cannot now afford to reject Kepler's theory on these
grounds is, as the rest of the passage makes clear, that the theory had mani-
fested through the Tabulae Rudolphinae a high degree of empirical accuracy.
The effect of the aesthetic properties of Kepler's theory on its reception is
unambiguous: far from contributing to the appeal of the theory initially, they
proved to be a hindrance to the theory's acceptance, and the hostility that
they generated had gradually to be overcome by demonstrations of the theory's
empirical power. This fact leads me, on the model of revolutions that I outlined
in Section 5, to portray Kepler's theory as constituting a revolution.
There is in fact good evidence, independent of any philosophical model
of scientific revolutions, that Kepler's theory represented a deeper innova-
tion in mathematical astronomy than Copernicus's. As Norwood R. Hanson
characterized this period: "The line between Ptolemy and Copernicus is
unbroken. The line between Copernicus and Newton is discontinuous, welded
only by the mighty innovations of Kepler" (Hanson, 1961, p. 169). Certainly
Kepler's theory is far more than a "version of Copernicus' proposal", as
Kühn characterizes it (Kühn, 1957, p. 219).
7. THE EFFECT OF AESTHETIC FACTORS UPON
THE COURSE OF SCIENCE
The evidence of early-modern mathematical astronomy can now be used in
a comparative evaluation of the view of aesthetic factors proposed by Kühn
and the one that I have been defending in this paper. Kühn takes scientists'
aesthetic considerations as prompting them to innovation, and thereby as
inducing scientific revolutions. I regard scientists' aesthetic preferences as
shaped by the aesthetic features of previous empirically successful theories,
and thereby as imposing a conservative check on styles of theorizing.
I feel that the evidence from early-modern planetary astronomy that we have
examined accords with my view better than with Kuhn's. My view suggests
appraisals of the theories of Copernicus and Kepler that agree with those given
by their contemporaries. On my view, we come to see Copernicus's as a theory
that, although not offering any improvement in predictive performance, was
deemed worthy of adoption in virtue of satisfying more fully than its Ptolemaic
predecessor certain aesthetic desiderata. For from sparking a revolution, this
theory was both intended and received as an orthodox contribution to the estab-
lished paradigm in mathematical astronomy. By contrast, we come to see
Kepler's as a theory that merited adoption in virtue of delivering superior
empirical performance, but could be adopted only if the aesthetic canon
that had dominated the discipline since Ptolemy's time was abandoned. This
rupture with the past was the true revolution in early-modern mathematical
astronomy.
The history of science records many theories of which the reception echoes
that of Copernicus's theory, and many that won adherents in a manner recalling
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Kepler's theory. For instance, Einstein's special theory of relativity stands
to classical physics much as Copernicus's theory stands to sixteenth-century
mathematical astronomy: it was an essentially conservative theory that won
acceptance largely in virtue of its aesthetic properties. By contrast, quantum
theory performed a break with classical physics as deep as that which Kepler's
theory performed with pre-existing mathematical astronomy, and had to rely
on its empirical virtues to attract physicists who were repelled on aesthetic
grounds.
The role of aesthetic factors in helping determine the course of science
cannot be properly appreciated unless their relation with empirical factors is
understood. If I am right, the usual suggestion that aesthetic factors are the
spirit of innovation in science, while empirical factors are the spirit of conti-
nuity, is the contrary of the truth.
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